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Note
Relative Futility: Limits to Genetic Privacy
Protection Because of the Inability to Prevent
Disclosure of Genetic Information by Relatives
Trevor Woodage∗
In March 2009, Alan and Keri Bearder joined eight other
families to sue the State of Minnesota and the Minnesota Department of Health for violating the genetic privacy rights of
their children.1 They claimed that in retaining, using, and disseminating blood and genetic information derived from DNA
samples taken from their children as part of a newborn genetic
screening program without written, informed consent, the Department of Health violated state genetic privacy law.2 The
families alleged that they “suffered damages, including but not
limited to, the fear of the use of their genetic information by
government and unknown private entities.”3
Indeed, many, if not most, of the fears expressed about genetic privacy relate to concerns that other parties will gain

∗ J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B. Med.
Sci. 1982, University of Newcastle, N.S.W., Australia; B. Med. 1984, University of Newcastle, N.S.W., Australia; Ph.D. 1994, University of Sydney, N.S.W.,
Australia. I thank Professor William McGeveran for his insightful guidance in
developing some of the concepts presented in this Note. I owe a debt of gratitude to the Editors of the Minnesota Law Review, in particular Joe Hansen, for
constructive edits and comments. Many scientific colleagues developed my
knowledge of, and interest in, genetics. Finally, nothing I do would be possible
without the love and support of my family. Copyright © 2010 by Trevor
Woodage.
1. See Bearder v. Minnesota, No. A10-101, 2010 WL 3307066 (Minn. Ct.
App. Aug. 24, 2010); Complaint, Bearder v. Minnesota, No. 27-CV-09-5615
(Hennepin County, Minn., Dist. Ct. Mar. 11, 2009), available at http://www
.cchconline.org/pr/FINAL_Plaintif_s_v_MDH_complaint.doc (last visited Nov.
7, 2010); Press Release, Citizens’ Council on Health Care, Nine Families Sue
State of Minnesota, Allege Violations of State Genetic Privacy Law in Newborn Screening (Mar. 11, 2009), available at http://www.cchconline.org/pr/
pr031109.php.
2. Press Release, Citizens’ Council on Health Care, supra note 1.
3. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 9.
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access to personal genetic information.4 What perhaps is not
widely appreciated is that genetic information is by its very nature not private because all humans share common genetic information with their relatives.5 Identical twins are genetically
the same, sharing essentially the same DNA sequences,6 while
other relatives share progressively smaller fractions of their
genetic code, depending upon the degree of relationship.7 These
observations give rise to an apparent paradox: how is it possible to keep genetic information private when the very DNA sequence on which it is based is held in common with an openended set of relatives? Federal and state legislation designed to
preserve the privacy of genetic information largely fails to address this issue.8
This Note argues that strong protection of genetic privacy
on an individual basis is likely to be an elusive goal. A more
satisfactory approach may be to develop legislative solutions
that ensure protection against uses of genetic information that
run counter to individual interests. Part I of this Note describes
existing approaches to genetic privacy and the manner in which
they relate to the treatment of other types of personal information. Part II analyzes several situations in which traditional
approaches to genetic privacy based on individual concepts of
4. See, e.g., Editorial, Genetic Privacy, BOS. GLOBE, June 6, 1999, at G6
(noting that legislators were “grappl[ing] with the basics of citizen [genetic]
privacy, seeking to protect the individual from misuse of those secrets in a
medical frontier that might easily become an Orwellian nightmare”); Douglas
A. Levy, Experts Call for Genetic Privacy Legislation, UNITED PRESS INT’L,
Oct. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Wire Service Stories (quoting U.S. Representative John Conyers as saying that “[p]ublic release of people’s genetic information is a Pandora’s Box that is best left unopened”); Sharon Schmickle,
Genetic-Privacy Fears Rippling Nationwide, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.),
Feb. 18, 2001, at 18A, available at 2001 WLNR 10302883 (quoting an employee subject to workplace genetic testing as saying, “I don’t want the entire
world to know if someone in our family has a potential for a disease”).
5. See JAMES J. NORA ET AL., MEDICAL GENETICS: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE 216 (4th ed. 1994) (“[A]lleles at linked loci tend to be inherited by
offspring in the same combinations in which they occur in parents.” (emphasis
omitted)).
6. See id. at 395 (“Identical . . . twins result from the splitting of a fertilized egg, giving rise to two genetically identical individuals.”).
7. THOMAS D. GELEHRTER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL GENETICS 52
(2d ed. 1998).
8. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.);
NANCY LEE JONES & AMANDA K. SARATA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30006,
GENETIC INFORMATION: LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO DISCRIMINATION AND
PRIVACY (updated Mar. 10, 2008).
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dominion over DNA sequence information will not adequately
address confidentiality issues raised by the sharing of genetic
sequences among relatives. It also addresses other legal paradigms that relate to the issue of genetic privacy. Part III proposes that such concerns could be addressed by educating
people about the ways in which genetic information can be used
and misused. Specifically, this Note concludes that protections
against the misuse of genetic information should be strengthened and, in parallel, proposes that the federal government or
the states develop legislation that would allow people to have
access to their own genetic records and to know who else has
access to the information.
I. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO GENETIC PRIVACY
As is too often the case with new technology, advances in
genetic research and the practical applications of such research
threaten to overtake the public’s readiness to understand these
advances and the law’s ability to deal with them.9 This Part describes the types of information that new methods of genetic
testing have made available. It also discusses the underpinnings of privacy as a protectable interest and current legal protections of genetic privacy.
A. GENETIC INFORMATION AND GENETIC VARIATION
Genetic information comes in different forms. It is generally possible to tell if people have a Y chromosome just by looking
at them.10 Physicians can confirm the presence of deleterious
mutations that cause heritable diseases, such as cystic fibrosis
or Huntington disease, by studying a patient’s pedigree.11 Yet,
popular usage increasingly accepts that when people talk about
genetic information they are referring to, either explicitly or
implicitly, DNA sequence information.12 DNA is composed of

9. See, e.g., Editorial, Genetic Privacy, supra note 4, at G6 (describing the
Massachusetts Legislature’s struggle to write genetic privacy laws that can
keep up with the rapid scientific progress in the field).
10. See GELEHRTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 178–79.
11. See id. at 23 (defining common genetic conditions as “diseases that are
the result of a single mutant gene . . . that are inherited in simple patterns”).
12. See DNA Sequencing Fact Sheet, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST.,
http://www.genome.gov/10001177 (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (“Scientists need
to know the sequence of bases because it tells them the kind of genetic information that is carried in a particular segment of DNA.”).
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long chains of four types of molecules known as nucleotides.13
The nucleotides are commonly abbreviated as A, C, G, and T,
and it is the order of these nucleotides that makes up the genetic information contained within DNA.14 The total set of DNA
sequences contained within each organism is known as the genome.15 Humans carry two copies of the genome, one inherited
from each parent,16 with each copy containing approximately
three billion nucleotides.17
The ability to read small portions of a person’s DNA sequence is now widely available, affordable, and used extensively for the study and diagnosis of genetic diseases.18 Continuing
technological improvements make it possible to determine large
amounts of genomic sequence for progressively lower costs.19
The Human Genome Project, a large, multinational effort, finished sequencing the human genome for the first time in 2003
at a total cost of approximately three billion dollars.20 In 2009,
it was possible to sequence a human genome for less than fifty
thousand dollars.21 It is widely expected that total sequencing
costs will be less than a thousand dollars, perhaps as little as
one hundred dollars, by 2015.22 The expectation that there will
be ubiquitous demand for genome sequencing drives much of
this cost reduction.23 At least part of this demand comes from
the belief that examination of a person’s DNA sequence will allow doctors and patients to identify predispositions to common
diseases and take steps to prevent or ameliorate the effects of
illness.24
13. JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 68 (4th
ed. 1987).
14. See id. at 74, 86–87. For instance, three nucleotides in the order CGA
instruct a cell to insert the amino acid arginine in a particular position in a
protein, or the sequence TAA tells a cell to complete the synthesis of a protein.
BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 367 (5th ed. 2008).
15. GELEHRTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 11.
16. NORA ET AL., supra note 5, at 12.
17. Id. at 11.
18. See DNA Sequencing Fact Sheet, supra note 12.
19. Id.
20. The Human Genome Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions,
NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/11006943 (last updated Apr. 7, 2009).
21. John Markoff, I.B.M. Joins Pursuit of $1,000 Genome, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 2009, at D2, available at 2009 WLNR 19662265.
22. See id. (discussing technological advances and the timeline with which
they are expected to reduce the total cost of sequencing the human genome).
23. See DNA Sequencing Fact Sheet, supra note 12.
24. See Advanced Sequencing Technology Awards 2008, NAT’L HUMAN
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Inherent in the notion that genetic information can be used
for individualized diagnosis of genetic disease is the recognition
that DNA sequences differ between people.25 If corresponding
stretches of DNA are compared from any two human chromosomes, there will be, on average, a difference approximately
once every thousand nucleotides.26 These sequence variants
are, at least in part, responsible for differences between people,
including physical characteristics,27 temperament and personality,28 and risk of developing a wide range of diseases.29 While
there is a vibrant debate regarding the relative contributions
that genetic, environmental, and other factors make towards
individual development, even the staunchest opponent of genetic determinism would admit that an individual’s DNA sequence
is an important determinant of personhood.30 This close association between DNA sequence and identification of a person as
an individual lies at the root of at least some calls for genetic
privacy.31
B. PRIVACY AS A PROTECTABLE INTEREST
American privacy jurisprudence dates, in large part, from
1890 with the publication of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s seminal article, The Right to Privacy.32 Facing technoloGENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/27527584 (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
25. See id.
26. See David E. Reich et al., Human Genome Sequence Variation and the
Influence of Gene History, Mutation and Recombination, 32 NATURE GENETICS
135, 135–36 (2002) (stating that the average rate of difference between two
gene sequences was on the order of 0.1 percent).
27. See Hannah Pulker et al., Finding Genes that Underlie Physical Traits
of Forensic Interest Using Genetic Tools, 1 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 100,
102–03 (2007).
28. See M.R. Munafò et al., Genetic Polymorphisms and Personality in
Healthy Adults: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 8 MOLECULAR
PSYCHIATRY 471, 471–72 (2003).
29. See DNA Sequencing Fact Sheet, supra note 12.
30. See George P. Smith, II & Thaddeus J. Burns, Genetic Determinism or
Genetic Discrimination?, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 25–35 (1994)
(discussing both the association between DNA sequence changes and complex
traits and concerns that claims are being made that “one’s fate is determined
by genetic inheritance”).
31. Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 744 –45
(2004) (noting associations between genetic information, conceptions of self,
and concerns about genetic privacy).
32. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ,
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gical developments that threatened exposure of otherwise private information,33 Warren and Brandeis proposed the recognition of a previously unprotected right—the right to privacy—
deserving of common law protections.34 Despite courts deciding
over three hundred civil privacy cases after publication of the
Warren and Brandeis article,35 it was not until 1960 that Dean
William Prosser formally classified the privacy torts.36 Prosser’s analytical framework was highly influential.37 The four
privacy torts that he described were subsequently recognized in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts,38 and have since been
adopted either at common law or by statute in the great majority of jurisdictions in the United States.39 The privacy tort most
relevant to genetic privacy is described in the Second Restatement of Torts as “publicity given to private life.”40 It states that
publicizing information relating to another’s private life that is
“highly offensive to a reasonable person” and “not of legitimate
concern to the public” is subject to liability.41
Although only protecting against possible government
usurpation of available privileges, the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut42 famously located a constitutional right to
privacy because “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras . . . [that] create zones of privacy.”43 Although

INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 10–12 (3d ed. 2009) (noting the origin and importance of the Warren and Brandeis article).
33. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 195 (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private
and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good
the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from
the house-tops.’”).
34. See id. at 218–19 (suggesting that the invasion of privacy should be
protected at common law as are other personal interests).
35. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 26.
36. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960)
(characterizing the four privacy torts as: (1) “Intrusion upon the plaintiff ’s seclusion or solitude”; (2) “Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about
the plaintiff ”; (3) “Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye”; and (4) “Appropriation . . . of the plaintiff ’s name or likeness”).
37. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 27.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–652E (1977).
39. See, e.g., Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234 –35
(Minn. 1998).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
41. Id.
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Id. at 484.
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Griswold’s protections related to marital privacy,44 the Supreme Court subsequently extended substantive due process
protections to information privacy.45 Despite this case law,
there is an unresolved circuit split as to whether there is a constitutional right to protection against disclosure of personal information.46 Nine circuits support a constitutional right to protection against such disclosures.47 However, the Sixth Circuit
denies the existence of a constitutional right to privacy in personal information,48 while the Eighth Circuit only regards the
right as applicable in instances involving egregious disclosure.49
In addition to federal constitutional protections, a number
of states have constitutional provisions directly providing for
the protection of privacy.50 Interestingly, the Supreme Court of
California held that, unlike most such provisions, the Californian constitutional right to privacy applies not only to state
agencies, but also to private entities.51 Clearly then, a range of
common law and constitutional protections can apply in any
particular situation. The next section examines how other, especially statutory, protections apply to issues associated with
genetic information.
C. STATUTORY PROTECTION OF GENETIC PRIVACY
Under one view, a person’s DNA is personal property. As
such, it is rightly considered subject to control by its “owner,”
and consequently deserves privacy protection.52 In Moore v. Re44. See id. at 485–86.
45. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (noting that constitutional protection of privacy extends to an “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”).
46. Diane M. DeGroat, Comment, When Students Test Positive, Their Privacy Fails: The Unconstitutionality of South Carolina’s HIV/AIDS Reporting
Requirement, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 751, 761–62 (2009).
47. Id. at 761; see also, e.g., Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192
(4th Cir. 1990); Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1988); Fadjo v. Coon,
633 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1981).
48. Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994).
49. Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993).
50. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 34; see also Mark Silverstein,
Note, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models for Illinois?, 1989 U. ILL.
L. REV. 215, 226–58 (reviewing existing state constitutional provisions as they
relate to the protection of privacy).
51. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994).
52. See Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE
GENETIC ERA 31, 49 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (“Proprietary genetic priva-
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gents of the University of California,53 the California Supreme
Court upset this expectation.54 In this widely cited case, the
court held that a patient’s property interests did not extend to
spleen cells that a surgeon removed from his body.55 Based on
Moore and similar decisions, several scholars have argued that
property rights are unlikely to provide meaningful protection of
genetic privacy.56
Beyond the apparent inability of property rights to protect
genetic privacy and the incomplete privacy protections afforded
by constitutional law,57 there are both federal and state statutory safeguards for genetic privacy. The Privacy Act of 1974
prohibits disclosure of records maintained on individuals by
federal government agencies except under specified conditions.58 Although providing for private rights of action59 and
criminal penalties,60 it does not provide broad genetic privacy
protections, because the statute applies only to federal agencies61 and requires that a plaintiff show that any violation was
“willful and intentional.”62
Congress created provisions that were more generally applicable to protecting the privacy of genetic information
through passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996.63 The main purpose of
cy is further suggested by the related notion that human DNA is owned by the
persons from whom it is taken, as a species of private property.”).
53. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
54. See id. at 488–93.
55. See id. (holding that a patient’s ownership interest over his cells does
not extend beyond the time the cells were taken from his body).
56. See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L.
REV. 359, 434 –36 (2000) (“[P]roperty traditionally implies alienability
. . . . Privacy, on the other hand, does not carry the same connotations. Personal privacy encompasses the right to possess one’s own body and the right to
exclude others, but does not embrace the power to give, sell, or otherwise
transfer body rights to other individuals.” (citations omitted)); Suter, supra
note 31, at 746 (“[T]he property model is deeply problematic as a tool to protect
our interests in genetic information.”).
57. See supra Part I.B (noting that constitutional privacy protections generally only protect against government actors and describing the circuit split over
whether there is a constitutional right to protection of personal information).
58. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
59. Id. § 552a(g)(1).
60. Id. § 552a(i).
61. Id. § 552a(a)(1).
62. Id. § 552a(g)(4).
63. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104 -191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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HIPAA was to allow employees to move between employers
without having their new health insurance plans exclude preexisting conditions from coverage.64 Congress was also concerned about the privacy and security of medical data that insurers would transmit when they processed insurance claims.65
Rather than directly creating privacy rules within HIPAA,
Congress authorized the Department of Health and Human
Services to propose regulations.66 A final version of those rules
went into effect in 2002.67 The regulations defined the information that was covered as “[i]ndividually identifiable health information,” that “[r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual . . . . and
. . . [t]hat identifies the individual; or . . . there is a reasonable
basis to believe the information can be used to identify the individual.”68 This definition includes genetic information as well
as information about an individual’s family history.69 A significant limitation of the scope of privacy protections under HIPAA
comes from the fact that the regulations do not apply to all individuals or entities with access to an individual’s health information; instead, they apply to “health plans[,] . . . health
care clearinghouses[,] . . . [and] health care provider[s].”70
The most recent federal attempt to secure genetic information was the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
(GINA).71 Congress primarily intended this legislation to prohibit discrimination based on a person’s genetic makeup in
health insurance and employment settings.72 However, using a
broad definition of “genetic information,”73 GINA also explicitly
64. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 431.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 431–32.
67. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
68. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2009).
69. JONES & SARATA, supra note 8, at CRS-19.
70. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102.
71. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
72. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 507.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 1191b(d) (Supp. II 2008) (defining “genetic information” to
mean “with respect to any individual, information about—(i) such individual’s
genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family members of such individual, and
(iii) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such individual,” and “genetic test” as the “analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes”).
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defines such data as health information for privacy purposes
under HIPAA.74 A comprehensive discussion of GINA is beyond
the scope of this Note, but the Act received a mixed critical
reaction and is likely not the last piece of federal legislation in
this field.75
Perhaps due to the perception of slow or limited action in
the federal arena, a convincing majority of state legislatures
enacted laws relating to the use of genetic information.76 Again,
much of the impetus behind these bills arose from concerns relating to employment or health insurance discrimination.77
Nonetheless, a recent survey of state legislative developments
revealed that twenty-seven states required consent to disclose
genetic information and eighteen states provided specific penalties for violations of genetic privacy.78
The existence of this broad range of legal protection of genetic privacy—common law, constitutional, statutory—seems to
be completely consistent with the suggestion that control of
access to genetic information is a worthwhile goal. There are,
however, arguments against relying on genetic privacy to protect underlying autonomy interests, both because maintaining
confidentiality of genetic information is not always desired, or
desirable, and because of inherent limits to the extent to which
confidentiality can be maintained.
II. LIMITS TO GENETIC PRIVACY
Although a variety of legal approaches to the protection of
genetic privacy interests exist, legislators and other concerned
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-9(a)(1), 1320d(4)(B) (Supp. II 2008).
75. See, e.g., Timothy J. Aspinwall, Imperfect Remedies: Legislative Efforts
to Prevent Genetic Discrimination, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 121, 122–23 (2010)
(describing health insurance protection under GINA, but noting that the legislation fails to protect against the use of genetic information in the context of
long-term care, disability, or life insurance); Mark A. Rothstein, Is GINA
Worth the Wait?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 174, 177 (2008) (noting both the symbolic value of declaring a policy against genetic discrimination and the dangers
of genetic exceptionalism—giving genetic information a privileged status as
compared with other forms of health information); Joanne Barken, Note,
Judging GINA: Does the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
Offer Adequate Protection?, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 545, 572–77 (2009) (arguing
that additional legislation will be needed to ensure adequate protection
against use of genetic information in employment situations).
76. See JONES & SARATA, supra note 8, at CRS-20 to CRS-21.
77. See id.
78. See Genetic Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www
.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/GeneticPrivacyLaws/tabid/14287/Default.aspx
(last updated Jan. 2008) (citing survey information current as of January 2008).
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parties seem to have paid less attention to two particular issues. First, those parties have failed to focus on why the confidentiality of genetic information should be maintained, and,
second, whether there are inherent limits to the amount of protection that can be given to genetic information. This Part discusses situations in which people may not desire genetic privacy or may even be harmed when genetic information is kept
confidential.
A. GENETIC PRIVACY: ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE THE HARM
Before delving more deeply into factors that might limit a
person’s ability to keep their DNA sequence a secret, it is worth
considering why such secrecy is even at issue. Why do people
want genetic privacy? Do people even really want to keep their
genetic information private? Moreover, what harm could occur
through unconsented access to DNA sequence information?
Consideration of these questions will help people understand
what efforts they should take to try to keep their genetic information confidential or, alternatively, what steps they should
take to minimize the chance of harm occurring through disclosure of this information.
1. Why Do People Want Genetic Privacy?
It is likely that some of the reasons underlying an individual’s interest in maintaining the privacy of genetic information
are the same as those for wanting to keep any personal information confidential.79 There is a widely held belief that genetic
information is an individual’s “property” and that control over
access to that information is one of the rights of ownership.80
There is also a long-standing belief that establishing a distinction between public and private domains is essential to the development of an autonomous sense of self.81 Another common
79. GRAEME LAURIE, GENETIC PRIVACY: A CHALLENGE TO MEDICO-LEGAL
NORMS 203–05 (2002).
80. See Margaret Everett, The Social Life of Genes: Privacy, Property and
the New Genetics, 56 SOC. SCI. & MED. 53, 56–58 (2003) (discussing different
approaches taken to the “genes as property” debate). But see Moore v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990) (refusing to recognize an
ownership interest in human body parts).
81. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 71 (1958) (“[T]he four
walls of one’s private property offer the only reliable hiding place from the
common public world . . . . A life spent entirely in public, in the presence of
others, becomes . . . shallow.”); Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 283 (1966) (“The ‘private life’ is a
secluded life, a life separated from the compelling burdens of public authority.”).
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belief is the idea that privacy relates not only to keeping information about oneself from the public domain, but also to controlling the information that one makes available to others.82 It
is possible to differentiate between “spatial” privacy, restricting
access to a person’s physical or psychological self, and “informational” privacy, restricting access about personal information.83
The second of these concepts is that which is most closely associated with the common public understanding of privacy and is
most relevant to the discussion of genetic privacy.84
Part of the motivation for wanting to keep genetic information secret may come from a belief that the information stored
in one’s DNA represents a “diary” of sorts that reveals insights
about one’s self and one’s future.85 Treatment of genetic information as having unique characteristics is known as “genetic
exceptionalism.”86 Based on this concept, some argue that DNA
sequence information warrants special forms of privacy protection.87 Consider, for example, one expression of this claim: “[i]f
genes determine aspects of our being and we cannot control our
genes, we feel the more dire need to control others’ access to our
genes and the information contained in them.”88 The belief in
the special importance of genetic data helps to feed concerns
that malefactors could use this powerful information against
the best interests of its “owner” and establishes the nexus between concerns about genetic privacy and genetic discrimination.89 Many individuals and interest groups have cited fears
relating to the possibility of genetic discrimination as a reason

82. See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (“Privacy is
not simply an absence of information about what is in the minds of others;
rather it is the control we have over information about ourselves.”).
83. LAURIE, supra note 79, at 6.
84. Id. at 6 n.27.
85. See George J. Annas, Genetic Prophecy and Genetic Privacy, 32 TRIAL
19, 20 (1996) (“The information in one’s DNA can be thought of as a coded
probabilistic future diary because it describes an important part of a person’s
unique future and, as such, can affect and undermine our view of ourself and
our life’s possibilities.”).
86. Margaret Everett, Can You Keep a (Genetic) Secret? The Genetic Privacy Movement, 13 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 273, 274 (2004).
87. See Annas, supra note 85, at 25 (“To the extent that we accord special
status to our genes and what they reveal, genetic information is uniquely powerful and uniquely personal, and thus merits unique privacy protection.”).
88. KEVIN M. KEENAN, INVASION OF PRIVACY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK
143 (2005).
89. See Everett, supra note 86, at 277 (commenting on the relationship
between genetic privacy and discrimination).
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for restricting access to genetic information.90 These concerns
were also the prime motivation for the enactment of legislation
protecting genetic privacy.91 Advocates for legislative safeguards were most worried about genetic discrimination in employment,92 and with respect to health insurance.93 Recent passage of health care reform legislation will likely do much to
reduce consumers’ fears that they could be denied health insurance because insurers will not be able to deny such insurance due to preexisting conditions after 2014.94 While this Note
is primarily concerned with the subject of genetic privacy, it is
relevant to mention that, despite great concerns regarding the
potential for genetic discrimination, it is controversial whether
actual genetic discrimination has occurred to any great extent.95 Another apparent result of genetic exceptionalism has
been the development of what are sometimes poorly defined
fears relating to the possible misuse of genetic information by

90. See Patricia Nemeth & Terry W. Bonnette, Genetic Discrimination in
Employment, 88 MICH. B.J. 42, 45 (2009) (“‘[M]any people were concerned that
genetic information could be used by employers to discriminate in hiring or
promotion decisions.’” (quoting MICH. LEG., FIRST ANALYSIS, SB 593, 90th
Sess., at 1 (2000), available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/1999
-2000/billanalysis/House/htm/1999-HLA-0593-A.htm); Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
President Calls for Genetic Privacy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A14,
available at 2007 WLNR 978490 (quoting President Bush’s statement that “it
is important that [genetic] information not be exploited in improper ways”);
supra note 4.
91. See supra Part I.C.
92. See, e.g., William J. McDevitt, I Dream of GINA: Understanding the
Employment Provisions of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008, 54 VILL. L. REV. 91, 93–96 (2009) (indicating that employment-related
safeguards were among the chief concerns related to genetic discrimination
under GINA).
93. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Fear of Insurance Trouble Leads Many to
Shun or Hide DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at A1, available at 2008
WLNR 3619695; Kathy L. Hudson et al., Genetic Discrimination and Health
Insurance: An Urgent Need for Reform, 270 SCIENCE 391, 392 (1995).
94. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111148, § 2704, 124 Stat. 119, 154; see also Peter Grier, Health Care Reform Bill
101: Rules for Preexisting Conditions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 24,
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 7558052.
95. See Pauline T. Kim, Regulating the Use of Genetic Information: Perspectives from the U.S. Experience, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 693, 695–96
(2010) (noting the rarity of cases of employment discrimination based on the
use of genetic information in the United States); Jeffrey S. Morrow, Note, Insuring Fairness: The Popular Creation of Genetic Antidiscrimination, 98 GEO.
L.J. 215, 225–26 (2009) (reviewing evidence for and against the occurrence of
frequent instances of genetic discrimination).
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government actors, such as the concerns raised by opponents of
newborn screening programs.96
Despite the similarities between genetic privacy and other
forms of privacy, there are differences. One interesting and important distinction is the potential desire for privacy from oneself, that is, choosing not to find out one’s own DNA sequence.
Unlike other forms of personal information, sequence data is
not “known” by an individual until there is a technological intervention—DNA sequencing. Especially in the context of genetic diseases that lack effective treatments, patients may
choose not to know whether they carry mutations.97 Indeed,
there is some evidence suggesting that after learning that they
would develop a fatal genetic condition, some carriers have chosen to attempt or commit suicide more commonly than would
otherwise have been the case.98
This discussion demonstrates that someone might choose
to keep their genetic information private for a host of reasons.
The most convincing of these arguments, however, seem to relate more to the occurrence of some manifest harm (denial of
employment opportunities or health insurance) than to more
abstract denials of personal autonomy.
2. Do People Want Genetic Privacy?
Having considered factors potentially leading to a desire
for genetic privacy, it is worth taking a step back and asking
whether most people actually care about keeping their DNA
sequence information confidential. Despite a variety of theoretical rationales supporting calls for genetic privacy, there is em96. See CCHC Testimony on MN Plan to Mandate Genetic Testing of Newborns, CITIZENS’ COUNCIL ON HEALTHCARE (Mar. 20, 2003) http://www
.cchconline.org/testimony/t032003.php (discussing state government plans to
implement a database for newborn genetic screening purposes: “This is not the
proper role of government in a free society. History has shown the less than
beneficent activities that can occur where such data systems exist”); see also
Bradley Graham, DNA Sampling Sparks Worries Two Marines Take Privacy
Issues to Court, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 14, 1996, at A22, available at 1996
WLNR 1342647 (citing concerns about the uses intended by the government
for genetic information obtained as a result of acquiring DNA samples from
military personnel).
97. Tuija Takala & Heta Aleksandra Gylling, Who Should Know About
Our Genetic Makeup and Why?, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 171, 172 (2000) (noting
that possible carriers are not under a prudential obligation to confirm their
mutation status if a disease is incurable).
98. Elisabeth W. Almqvist et al., A Worldwide Assessment of the Frequency of Suicide, Suicide Attempts, or Psychiatric Hospitalization After Predictive
Testing for Huntington Disease, 64 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1293, 1300–01 (1999).
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pirical evidence of widespread public support for the use of genetic information in a range of settings, at least some of which
are not compatible with universal genetic privacy protection.99
Public concerns with genetic information seem to coalesce
around worries associated with particular uses of that information, particularly possible employment and insurance discrimination.100 Studies of people whose relatives have had cancer
support the argument that some individuals are concerned
about the use of genetic information because of fears about potential genetic discrimination—they appear more likely than
the general public to express concerns about who has access to
their genetic information.101
Surveys of both the public and research study participants
indicate the widespread support for the use of genetic information for research.102 An interesting, and large-scale, example of
this phenomenon comes from Iceland where, despite the fact
that deCODE Genetics, a private company, is carrying out
much of the research,103 the Icelandic public generally supports
99. An online survey carried out in August 2006 examined the opinions of
3091 U.S. adults towards genetics and the uses of genetic information. Public
Overwhelmingly Supportive of Genetic Science and Its Use for a Wide Variety
of Medical, Law Enforcement and Personal Purposes, HARRIS INTERACTIVE
(Aug. 30, 2006), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?
NewsID=1088 [hereinafter HARRIS INTERACTIVE]. Ninety-three percent of respondents agreed that the “science of genetics and DNA” was a “very good [or]
good thing.” Id. The same percentage of respondents strongly or somewhat
supported the use of genetic information “[t]o identify criminals in rape, murder and other crimes.” Id. Eighty-five percent or more of those surveyed were
similarly supportive of the use of genetic information for establishing paternity, carrying out research to find new ways to prevent or treat diseases, testing
by doctors to identify diseases for which people are at risk, and tracing one’s
family tree and ancestors. Id.
100. See id. (stating that only fourteen percent of respondents supported
the use of genetic information by insurance companies to determine who to
insure and how much to charge, while twelve percent supported its use by employers to help decide whether to employ a person).
101. See Kira A. Apse et al., Perceptions of Genetic Discrimination Among
At-Risk Relatives of Colorectal Cancer Patients, 6 GENETICS MED. 510, 513
tbl.2 (2004) (noting, for instance, that forty-seven percent of survey participants would be likely or very likely to ask that their genetic test results be excluded from their medical record).
102. See Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., From Genetic Privacy to Open Consent,
9 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 406, 408 (2008) (citing the willingness of subjects to participate in genetic research); HARRIS INTERACTIVE, supra note 99
(stating that ninety-one percent of survey participants supported the use of
genetic information for genetic disease research).
103. See Sarah Lyall, A Country Unveils Its Gene Pool and Debate Flares,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at F1, available at 1999 WLNR 3030501 (explain-
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access to genetic information.104 With a genetically homogeneous population of approximately 280,000 people and a welldeveloped medical record system, geneticists regard Iceland as
particularly fertile ground for studies aimed at identifying disease genes.105 The database cataloguing the study’s subjects
and their family members contains information on almost half
the people who have ever lived in Iceland.106 While Icelanders
may be particularly well disposed to participating in genetic research because of pride in their homogeneous ancestry,107 they
exemplify the willingness to allow access to personal genetic information also seen in the United States in the research setting.108
In an interesting paradigm shift, the Personal Genome
Project (PGP), an initiative exploring issues related to genome
sequencing of individuals, moved from traditional conceptions
of genetic privacy to an “open consent” model for its genetic research and DNA sequencing.109 The PGP provides for openaccess distribution of sequence data and medical information,
with the aim of developing an improved understanding of the
ways in which scientists and physicians can use genetic information for medical research.110 The first ten participants in the
program, the PGP-10, volunteered to make their names, personal medical histories, and full genome sequences publicly
available.111 Although beginning as a small-scale pilot project,

ing the breadth of the deCODE project).
104. See Gísli Pálsson & Kristín E. Harðardóttir, For Whom the Cell Tolls:
Debates About Biomedicine, 43 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 271, 283 (2002) (noting that many Icelanders were eager to contribute their blood samples and
medical records to genetic research programs).
105. Id. at 275–76.
106. Id. at 277; see also id. (noting also that Icelanders have a particular
interest in maintaining comprehensive family trees).
107. See id. at 283 (“Many Icelanders seem proud of their ‘Nordic’ roots and
their genetic makeup, and they are eager to ‘offer’ their ‘unique’ blood samples
and medical records . . . to science and the advancement of human well-being.”
(citation omitted)).
108. See supra notes 99, 102 and accompanying text.
109. See Lunshof et al., supra note 102, at 406.
110. See Mission, PERS. GENOME PROJECT, http://www.personalgenomes.org/
mission.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (discussing the goals of the project,
among which is to improve “understanding of personal genomics and its potential”).
111. PGP-10, PERS. GENOME PROJECT, http://www.personalgenomes.org/
pgp10.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2009).
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the PGP plans to enroll up to 100,000 participants.112 That over
11,000 people registered for information about participating in
the PGP demonstrates that a substantial number of people appear to be willing to allow open access to their genetic information.113
The willingness of large numbers of individuals involved in
medical research or initiatives such as the PGP to allow access
to their DNA sequence and other genetic information shows
that a desire for strict maintenance of genetic privacy is not
universal.
3. The Flip Side: Can Genetic Privacy Do Harm?
Even assuming an increasing acceptance of the notion that
strict maintenance of genetic privacy is not necessary in all circumstances, there may also be times when restricting access to
genetic information can actually be harmful.
While a person might choose to keep genetic information
private from herself when faced with the prospect of finding
that she might carry a mutation for an untreatable genetic
condition,114 in a different circumstance, she might instead
choose not to know when there was a chance that she might be
at risk of developing a preventable or treatable disorder. Such
scenarios are well known in the case of common malignancies
such as breast cancer, with knowledge of carrier status allowing for effective preventative measures.115 A person’s right not
to know this type of information can be justified on the grounds
of autonomy or individual self-determination.116 The situation
112. See Events, PERS. GENOME PROJECT, http://www.personalgenomes.org/
events/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (noting that the Harvard Medical School Institutional Review Board approved the involvement of one participant in the
PGP in 2005, expanded that approval to ten participants in 2006, and again
expanded approval to 100,000 participants in 2008).
113. See Newsletter #1, PERS. GENOME PROJECT (Apr. 2009), http://www
.personalgenomes.org/newsletter/01.html.
114. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
115. Deborah Schrag et al., Life Expectancy Gains from Cancer Prevention
Strategies for Women with Breast Cancer and BRCA1 or BRCA2 Mutations,
283 JAMA 617, 617 (2000).
116. See R. Andorno, The Right Not to Know: An Autonomy Based Approach, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 435, 436–37 (2004) (discussing the theoretical underpinnings of the “right not to know”). But cf. Gillian Nycum et al., IntraFamilial Obligations to Communicate Genetic Risk Information: What Foundations? What Forms?, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 21, 42–45 (2009) (suggesting
that people might owe a duty of care to their genetic relatives and would thus
be obliged to disclose knowledge of mutations associated with disease risk).
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becomes more complicated, though, when a person’s exercise of
a right not to know could affect the health of another. For example, a man might decide that he did not want to know that
he carried a mutation in a gene that was associated with a high
risk of developing breast cancer in females. His sister, however,
might have wanted to have been alerted to a need to be tested
for the mutation, and, if she proved positive, to take steps to
reduce her chance of developing cancer. This type of consideration suggests that it would be appropriate to limit the right not
to know in certain circumstances.117 These situations can, of
course, be particularly complicated in the case of parental consent to genetic tests for minor children, where considerations of
the importance of genetic information to other family members
are further complicated by children’s autonomy becoming subservient to that of their parents.118
These considerations provide evidence for the contention
that unfettered restrictions on the dissemination of genetic information can, at least in some circumstances, result in harm.
Difficult issues arise when the autonomy interests of different
individuals are balanced. At the least, these concerns strengthen arguments for flexibility in access to genetic information
when benefits outweigh harms. However, even when a person’s
interests in keeping DNA sequence information confidential are
not challenged by a need for access by others, that person’s
ability to prevent others from reaching conclusions about that
sequence information may be constrained by factors beyond his
control.
B. LIMITS TO GENETIC PRIVACY
Many things outside a person’s control can result in the violation of his or her genetic privacy. Such forces include accidental or intentionally malicious data release, hacking, and
hardware and data theft.119 While this Note will not discuss
117. See Andorno, supra note 116, at 439 (noting that the right not to know
“is a relative right, in the sense that it may be restricted when disclosure to
the individual is necessary in order to avoid serious harm to third parties, especially family members”); see also Nycum et al., supra note 116, at 39–47
(discussing possible moral and legal obligations requiring disclosure of genetic
information to at-risk family members).
118. See Lainie Friedman Ross & Margaret R. Moon, Ethical Issues in Genetic Testing of Children, 154 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 873,
873–74 (2000) (discussing implications of parental control over consent for genetic tests).
119. Lunshof et al., supra note 102, at 407.
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these computer technology-related occurrences in any more detail, the fact that computerized databases containing personal
data can be targets of malevolent activity provides a background level of concern that, no matter what the “owners” of
genetic information choose to do with that information, the ultimate disposition of the data may be beyond their influence.
Indeed, a primary thesis of this Note is that, by its very nature,
people cannot exert complete dominion over their genetic information and, for that reason, concerns about genetic privacy,
as such, warrant reconsideration. Factors limiting genetic privacy include sharing of DNA sequence information between
relatives and computational techniques that can identify specific individuals from large DNA sequence databases. These concepts coalesce with recent developments in the ability of crime
investigators to use partial forensic matches to identify suspects based on their relationship to defendants that have already been typed by DNA forensic laboratories.
1. DNA Sequence Information as a Shared Attribute
Except for identical twins120 and, potentially in the future,
clones,121 no two human beings have identical genomic DNA
sequences.122 This unique association between each person and
his DNA sequence would seem to support a strong, and protectable, privacy interest. However, of course, people did not
create their own DNA; rather, they inherited it from their parents, with equal maternal and paternal contributions.123 Similarly, everyone shares DNA sequences to a greater or lesser degree with family members, depending upon the degree of
genetic relatedness.124 That is not to say, of course, that because a scientist knows the complete genetic sequence of someone’s mother, brother, or daughter, that she knows the precise
content of fifty percent of that person’s genetic code. Rather,
the scientist can make a probabilistic statement that the index
120. NORA ET AL., supra note 5, at 395.
121. See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on Human Cloning, HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 647 (1998) (noting
that clones are genetically identical to the source individual except for the minor contribution from mitochondrial DNA).
122. See A.J. Jeffreys et al., Individual-Specific “Fingerprints” of Human
DNA, 316 NATURE 76, 76–77 (1985) (describing the development of a genetic
test producing results that are “completely specific to an individual”).
123. See NORA ET AL., supra note 5, at 6–7 (describing the formation of an
embryo from equal numbers of chromosomes from each gamete).
124. See GELEHRTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 52.
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subject shares half the DNA sequence of his first-degree relative, but it is not possible to say precisely which parts of the sequence are in common.125 With the availability of DNA sequence information from multiple relatives, however, it is
possible to make increasingly certain inferences about the DNA
sequence that is present in a specific person.126 There are several ways that shared DNA sequences could manifest as limitations on a person’s ability to maintain genetic privacy. For instance, someone whose father died of Huntington disease, a
rare, fatal neurodegenerative condition inherited by fifty percent of a sufferer’s offspring,127 might decide that she did not
want to know whether she carried the mutation. If that person’s daughter decided that she did want to be tested and, for
whatever reason, announced to the world that she had inherited the mutation, then her parent would, in effect, be “outed”
as a carrier, despite his wishes to the contrary.
While formally prohibited by GINA,128 it would be difficult
to prove the possibility that a health insurer had decided to deny coverage to relatives of known mutation carriers. While the
insurer would not be certain the people it denied coverage carried mutations themselves, even a fifty percent chance of avoiding the high cost of treating a cancer patient might be attractive.129 While there is little evidence that insurers or other
125. Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 251–52 (2006) (discussing the degree and random nature of DNA sharing by relatives).
126. If individuals Alan, Bill, and Charlie are grandfather, son, and grandson, respectively, and an investigator had access to DNA sequence information
from Alan and Charlie, then it would be possible to make accurate predictions
about Bill’s DNA sequence. For example, if at a particular region on chromosome
fifteen, Alan had chromosomal sequences of CCTGATGC and CATGGTGT
(one copy inherited from each of Alan’s parents; underlined letters indicate
nucleotides that vary between individuals), and Charlie’s sequence showed
CCTGGTGC and CATGGTGT, then an investigator could predict with a reasonable degree of certainty that Bill carried at least one copy of CATGGTGT, the
sequence that Charlie had inherited—through Bill—from his grandfather Alan.
127. Michael R. Hayden & Berry Kremer, Basal Ganglia Disorders, in 2
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL GENETICS 2197, 2203–07 (David L.
Rimoin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997) (describing the fatal nature of the disorder and
stating that it is inherited in an autosomal dominant manner, i.e., that half of
a carrier’s offspring will inherit the disease).
128. See 29 U.S.C. § 1191b(d)(6)(a) (Supp. II 2008) (including the use of DNA
test results or disease manifestations in relatives under prohibited conduct).
129. See Economic Impact of Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer
.org/cancer/cancerbasics/economic-impact-of-cancer (last visited Nov. 7, 2010)
(noting the estimated health expenditures for cancer topped ninety-three billion dollars in 2008).
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potential users of genetic information have denied benefits or
otherwise discriminated against the relatives of mutation carriers,130 there is evidence to suggest that these relatives are
concerned about what might be termed genetic discrimination
by proxy.131
Whatever might occur in other settings, it is certainly the
case that, in most research settings, direct consent from the
subjects involved, and not from their relatives, is all that is required for genetic investigations and publications of DNA sequence data.132 Indeed, even in high-profile sequencing programs, such as the PGP, the most that research subjects are
asked to do is to consider the impact of their participation in
the research; there is no requirement that close relatives also
provide consent.133
2. Identification of Individuals from Large Data Sets
One of the primary ways that people have been able to
maintain a level of comfort while participating in genetic research is that their consent to participate in studies was generally given under an assurance that any information disclosed
consequent to the study would be made in an anonymous manner.134 This promise of anonymity, however, can be defeated because genetic sequence information is uniquely capable of iden-

130. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
131. Apse et al., supra note 101, at 512.
132. See David A. Wheeler et al., The Complete Genome of an Individual by
Massively Parallel DNA Sequencing, 452 NATURE 872, 875 (2008) (“Thirdparty relatives are not typically considered research participants and their
consent is not generally required for research participation.”).
133. See Harvard Medical School, Consent Form, PERS. GENOME PROJECT,
http://www.personalgenomes.org/consent/PGP_Consent_Approved03242009.pdf
(last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (stating that participants were “strongly encouraged
to discuss this study and its potential risks with [their] immediate family
members,” but were not required to seek their consent); see also Wheeler et al.,
supra note 132, at 875 (stating that, with respect to a research project resulting in the publication of the complete genome sequence of James Watson, the
co-discoverer of the structure of DNA, Dr. Watson was “strongly encouraged to
discuss these issues with biological relatives and to make a family decision
about research participation and data release,” but that “[t]he participant’s
autonomous decision to participation in research typically outweighs any objections raised by third-party relatives”).
134. See Lunshof et al., supra note 102, at 408 (“A crucial consideration is
that consent for disclosure . . . is given only upon certain conditions; a key
condition usually being the assurance of secrecy with regard to personal identity and information content.”).
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tifying someone, providing greater discriminative capability
than a person’s name or standard demographic data.135
A striking example of being able to identify someone using
DNA sequence was the case of a teenage boy who, with the aid
of genetic analysis, was able to track down his anonymous
sperm-donor father.136 In a similar vein, a direct-to-consumer
genetics company recently announced the launch of a service
that would let customers with DNA sequence information in its
database identify and contact probable near and distant relatives.137 To make things even worse, using newly developed genetic techniques and statistical approaches, it now appears
possible for someone to “re-identify” an individual’s genetic data from large pools of anonymized and aggregated genomic data.138 The significance of these developments is magnified when
contextualized by the ever-expanding nature of the genetic databases that are available on the Internet and the fact that,
once information is online, it forms what is essentially a permanent record that cannot be expunged.139 Thus, not only can a

135. See ASHG Response to NIH on Genome-Wide Association Studies, AM.
SOC’Y HUM. GENETICS (Nov. 30, 2006), http://www.ashg.org/pages/statement_
nov3006.shtml (“[T]he most accurate individual identifier is the DNA sequence
itself or its surrogate here, genotypes across the genome. It is clear that these
available genotypes alone, available on tens to hundreds of thousands of individuals in the repository, are more accurate identifiers than demographic variables alone . . . .”).
136. Alison Motluck, Tracing Dad Online, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 5, 2005, at
6, 6 (noting that a resourceful fifteen-year-old boy was able to identify his
anonymous sperm-donor father by sending his own DNA for analysis of Y
chromosome (paternal lineage) markers, matching the pattern to a surname in
a genealogy database, and then using that name along with some basic demographic information about the sperm donor to identify and contact his genetic
father); see also Dawn R. Swink & J. Brad Reich, Caveat Vendor: Potential
Progeny, Paternity, and Product Liability Online, 2007 BYU L. REV. 857, 857–
69 (discussing the same case and recent trends allowing for the identification
of anonymous sperm donors through genetic analysis and the Internet).
137. See Lawrence Hon, Introducing Relative Finder: The Newest Feature
from 23andMe, SPITTOON (Nov. 19, 2009, 5:13 PM), http://spittoon.23andme
.com/2009/11/19/introducing-relative-finder-the-newest-feature-from-23andme
(discussing the launch of the service and noting, with no apparent irony, that
“[w]ith Relative Finder, you can discover more about your ancestry than you ever thought possible!,” and that “[a]fter all, you never know who you might find”).
138. See Dan Vorhaus, Re-identification and Its Discontents, GENOMICS L.
REP. (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2009/10/13/
re-identification-and-its-discontents.
139. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1412 (2001) (noting
that once information appears on the Internet it creates “a permanent record
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person not be assured of anonymity of DNA sequence information, once that genetic information has been posted on the Internet it is essentially beyond his or her control forever.
3. Criminal Law and Partial Forensic Matches
There is at least one circumstance that, in what might otherwise be characterized as an invasion of genetic privacy, receives wide support. Every jurisdiction in the United States
maintains a database containing genetic information from offenders to enable forensic DNA analysis.140 These databases
and associated DNA-sampling programs survived constitutional and other legal challenges, with the judiciary determining
that the public interest in solving crimes overcomes the privacy
expectations of suspects.141 While, to date, these initiatives
have been restricted to those who were convicted of, or at least
arrested in connection with, felonies,142 some commentators
have called for the expansion of these databases to provide for
population-wide coverage to assist crime-prevention efforts.143
Having considered the ways in which information regarding shared DNA sequences can be used in other contexts, it
should be no surprise to learn that similar applications are
possible, and have begun to be used, in the criminal justice setting. Forensic investigators can use “familial searching” when a
crime-scene DNA sample comes up with a partial match to a
sample in an offender database.144 The police have used this
method successfully on a number of occasions in the United
Kingdom and at least once in the United States.145 The legal
of unparalleled pervasiveness and depth. . . . [A]lmost everything on the Internet is being archived”).
140. See Greely et al., supra note 125, at 250 (“[E]very American state ha[s]
established forensic DNA databases.”).
141. Aaron B. Chapin, Note, Arresting DNA: Privacy Expectations of Free
Citizens Versus Post-Convicted Persons and the Unconstitutionality of DNA
Dragnets, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1842, 1847–55 (2005) (reviewing the general tendency under the “special needs” doctrine of the Fourth Amendment and the
DNA Act of 2000 to uphold the legality of forensic DNA databases).
142. See Greely et al., supra note 125, at 250.
143. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS.
L. REV. 413, 415; Michael Seringhaus, Op-Ed., To Stop Crime, Share Your
Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010, at A23, available at 2010 WLNR 5373377.
144. See Greely et al., supra note 125, at 248–49.
145. See, e.g., id. (discussing the use of familial DNA to catch several felons
in the United States and United Kingdom); Jennifer Steinhauer, “Grim Sleeper” Arrest Fans Debate on DNA Use, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2010, at A14, availa-
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status of this procedure is not yet settled in the United States,
with concerns relating to the constitutionality of searching familial DNA samples having, so far, escaped any significant litigation.146 If the practice of familial DNA searching does become
entrenched in criminal forensic practice, however, it could become a common example of a relative’s DNA sequence being
used to identify a person who did not wish his genetic information to be accessible to others. In light of such developments,
new approaches to protecting individual interests in controlling
the access to, and use of, genetic information are needed.
C. BEYOND GENETIC PRIVACY LAW: LOOKING TO OTHER LEGAL
PARADIGMS FOR GUIDANCE
Given the absence of case law on point and that federal and
state genetic privacy legislation was not designed to deal with
the challenges of shared genetic information, it may be helpful
to look to other bodies of law for guidance about how to deal
with these issues. Looking to parallels with situations in which
one party disclosed shared, non-genetic information in a manner that was adverse to the interests of another party provides
useful analogies.
In 2001, Susana Kaysen published a memoir in which she
described intimate details of her relationship with Joseph Bonome.147 Despite altering certain details about Bonome’s life,
such as his occupation, and only referring to him as her “boyfriend,” many of his friends and business clientele understood
that he was the person portrayed in the book.148 Kaysen did not
tell Bonome of the content of the book or seek his permission
for publication.149 The Superior Court of Massachusetts held
that Kaysen’s First Amendment rights to expression outweighed any privacy interest enjoyed by Bonome so long as the
ble at 2010 WLNR 13801521 (recounting the role of familial DNA searching in
leading to the apprehension of a serial killer in California).
146. See, e.g., Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A
Genetic Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 26–
57 (2010) (examining constitutional and other legal issues associated with familial DNA searching); Kimberly A. Wah, Note, A New Investigative Lead:
Familial Searching as an Effective Crime-Fighting Tool, 29 WHITTIER L. REV.
909, 931–43 (2008) (making the case that familial searching does not pose insoluble constitutional dilemmas).
147. Bonome v. Kaysen, No. 032767, 2004 WL 1194731, at *1 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Mar. 3, 2004).
148. Id. at *1–2.
149. Id. at *1.
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details related to matters of “legitimate public concern.”150 This
suggests that actually overcoming the right to privacy in Massachusetts requires a publication of private facts that are of
genuine interest to the public. The court, however, also suggested that “[t]here is an additional interest in this case: Kaysen’s right to disclose her own intimate affairs.”151 Further, it
noted that “it is critical that Kaysen was not a disinterested
third party telling Bonome’s personal story . . . . Rather, she is
telling her own personal story—which inextricably involves Bonome in an intimate way.”152 Rather than requiring a balance
with public interest, Professor Sonja West argues that when
autobiographical speech is involved “[t]he power to decide what
is of consequence in a person’s life story should ultimately lie
with that person alone. As long as the content and intention of
the speech is truly autobiographical, its perceived importance
by others should not affect its constitutional protection.”153
Given the proposed analogy between genetic information
and a diary,154 it is easy to read the preceding analysis as applying to disclosure of shared genetic information without the
consent of a relative. This raises the issue of whether a First
Amendment right to disclose genetic information requires that
the disclosure be in the public interest to overcome the genetic
privacy interests of relatives. If so, it is necessary to determine
how high a bar is set by a requirement for public interest. In
Florida Star v. B.J.F., by holding that “where a newspaper
publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained,
punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order,”155 the
U.S. Supreme Court set a low bar indeed. Professor Andrew
McClurg has gone so far as to argue that the public disclosure
tort produces an unconstitutional chilling of speech under the
150. Id. at *4 (citing Peckham v. Bos. Herald, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 888, 892
(Mass. App. Ct. 1999)). The court came to an expansive reading of the interest,
stating that “[t]he scope of a matter of legitimate concern to the public is not
limited to ‘news,’ in the sense of reports of current events or activities. It extends
also to the use of names, likenesses, or facts in giving information to the public
for purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, when the public may
reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published.” Id.
at *5 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. j (1977)).
151. Id. at *6.
152. Id.
153. Sonja R. West, The Story of Me: The Underprotection of Autobiographical Speech, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 905, 966 (2006).
154. See Annas, supra note 85, at 20.
155. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
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First Amendment.156 Following Professor Eugene Volokh’s
claim that contract law may be able to allow the enforcement of
confidentiality obligations, even in the face of free speech challenges,157 McClurg suggested that parties involved in intimate
relationships have implicitly entered into contracts not to divulge confidential information about each other.158
Despite the above arguments, it is difficult to conceive of a
court that would interfere with a person’s desire to publish his
“own” DNA sequence data. Any such restriction, by the theories
outlined above, could arise from some form of duty of confidentiality owed by one person to others with whom he or she
shared genetic information. While English courts apply the law
of confidentiality broadly to cover spouses, ex-spouses, and others, United States courts are much less inclined to impose a duty of confidentiality within interpersonal relationships.159
The related concept of spousal privilege could also serve as
an analogous, but flawed, model for preventing disclosure of
genetic information shared by relatives. The spousal privilege
precludes the testimony of one spouse that might be adverse to
the interests of the other.160 A person concerned about disclosure of her DNA sequence would most likely fail in her arguments that she could rely on the privilege to protect against
disclosure of shared genetic information by her kin, as the
spousal privilege is only available in criminal matters.161 Further, while in the traditional model for spousal privilege one
spouse can prevent the other from testifying even if the spouse
is willing to do so, this approach is now a minority view, with
the modern tendency being for the witness spouse to hold the
156. Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship
Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887,
888 (2006).
157. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057 (2000).
158. See McClurg, supra note 156, at 912–15.
159. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 126 (2007) (“[I]n England,
spouses, ex-spouses, friends, and nearly anyone else can be liable for divulging
confidences . . . [while] American privacy law has never fully embraced privacy
within relationships.”).
160. See Milton C. Reagan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2045, 2055 (1995) (“[T]he purpose of the privilege ‘is to
. . . prevent[ ] husband and wife from becoming adversaries in a criminal proceeding.’” (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 476 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir.
1973))).
161. Id.
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privilege.162 It is likely that societal forces in favor of individual
autonomy will continue to support uncoerced choice as the basis for imposing limits on permissible testimony such as traditional forms of spousal immunity,163 and there is little reason to
believe that the traditional doctrine would apply in the genetic
privacy situation.
If First Amendment and other considerations will likely
not impede consensual disclosure of shared genetic information,
even when doing so is against the wishes and interests of
another, it may be more helpful to find other ways to protect
these interests. While there is a widespread consensus in the
community that discrimination based on one’s genetic constitution should not be allowed,164 the arguments in Part II of this
Note suggest that limits to the ability to enforce genetic privacy
require a more nuanced approach than what may be untenable
attempts to protect the confidentiality of shared DNA sequence
information.
III. CRAFTING SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF
GENETIC PRIVACY
Attempting to protect a person’s genetic privacy interests
by preventing others from having access to that individual’s
DNA sequence information may be ineffective because of the
shared nature of genetic information. Rather, it may be more
productive to focus on preventing harm brought about by the
misuse of that data. This Part considers steps that legislators
and others could take to strengthen protections against genetic
discrimination. In particular, the fact that people do not have
the untrammeled ability to control access to “their” DNA se162. Id. at 2053–54 (noting that the traditional approach binding one
spouse to the wishes of the other applies in only thirteen states, while the approach in which the witness spouse alone could invoke the privilege applies in
twenty-one states, federal court, and the District of Columbia).
163. See, e.g., Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives
on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1032, 1064 –80
(1996) (examining and criticizing the role of traditional spousal immunity
from a feminist perspective, and arguing that individual autonomy should
prevail over compelled testimony).
164. See, e.g., Editorial, A Ban on Genetic Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
22, 2009, at WK9, available at 2009 WLNR 23542177 (welcoming the effects
and intent of the genetic nondiscrimination features of GINA). But see Jeremy
A. Colby, Note, An Analysis of Genetic Discrimination Legislation Proposed by
the 105th Congress, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 443, 459–63 (1998) (discussing arguments that have been made against genetic nondiscrimination legislation,
most prominently by employer organizations and the insurance industry).

2010]

RELATIVE FUTILITY

709

quence needs to be more widely appreciated and understood.
Additionally, Congress could provide a powerful means to
guard against genetic discrimination by enacting legislation
that assures individuals know who accesses their genetic information and for what purpose. Resulting public scrutiny
would likely produce strong normative pressures inhibiting
misuse of genetic information and prevent possible genetic discrimination.
A. THE REAL TARGET—PREVENTING GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
If, as suggested, the real problem is genetic discrimination,
it is important that legislators, interest groups, and the public
understand the difference—and indeed that there is a difference—between the need for protections against genetic discrimination and the need for genetic privacy. The first step is to
educate stakeholders about the issues involved. One way to do
this is to educate and encourage those who purport to be expert
in the field to use the terms carefully and correctly. As an example of information that only serves to mislead, the public
website for the United States Department of Energy Genome
Program headlines an otherwise informative webpage about
the effects of GINA with the title: “Genetics Privacy and Legislation.”165 The accompanying text makes no mention of genetic
privacy, but rather discusses the impacts of the legislation with
respect to genetic discrimination.166 While the task of educating
the community about the issues discussed in this Note is undoubtedly a challenging one, it is not hopeless.167
Another important objective is to ensure that strong protections against genetic discrimination continue to be developed
and enforced. It is too soon to be certain of the impact of GINA
and other federal legislation against the occurrence of genetic
discrimination.168 The high-profile nature of such matters will
165. Genetics Privacy and Legislation, HUM. GENOME PROJECT INFO.,
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/legislat.shtml (last
modified Sept. 16, 2008).
166. See id.
167. Progress is evident as displayed in a recent New York Times editorial
discussing GINA. The editorial focuses squarely on the issue of genetic discrimination with no conflation between the concepts of genetic discrimination
and genetic privacy. Editorial, A Ban on Genetic Discrimination, supra note 164,
at WK9.
168. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 75, at 174 (suggesting that GINA is
“fatally flawed” and its goals cannot be met without addressing broader issues
relating to the health finance system).
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help ensure that any deficiencies in current legislation and associated regulations are quickly exposed. It is worth noting that
GINA makes provision for, and forbids, the possibility of genetic discrimination based on genetic test results performed on
relatives.169 Other legislation and regulations, both state and
federal, likewise should include similar provisions to ensure
they have similar reach.
B. TOWARD A SEMI-TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: DISCLOSING
DISCLOSURE
In an influential book from 1998, the science fiction writer
and futurist David Brin developed the concept of what he
termed the “Transparent Society.”170 He considered a world of
ubiquitous surveillance and data gathering in which despotism
was avoided and accountability maintained by “transparency”
and two-way flows of information, allowing tabs to be kept on
those behind the surveillance and data gathering.171 The point
Brin was making was that
[t]ransparency is not about eliminating privacy. It is about giving us
the power to hold accountable those who would violate it. Privacy implies serenity at home and the right to be let alone. It may be irksome
how much other people know about me, but I have no right to police
their minds. On the other hand I care very deeply about what others
do to me and to those I love.172

Strictly applying the same underlying precepts put forward
by Brin to the flow of genetic information may be neither practicable nor meet the desired goals. It would probably not benefit
a consumer who feared that an insurance company would deny
him health insurance to have access to the complete genome
sequence of the CEO of the insurance company. What would
likely be more helpful is what could be called “semitransparency”—allowing people to know who had accessed
their genetic information and for what purpose.
In fact, there is already federal legislation in another
sphere that, if applied in an analogous manner, could provide
just the desired functionality. Congress passed the Fair Credit
169. See 29 U.S.C. § 1191b(d)(6)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 2008) (defining genetic information as including “genetic tests of family members”); see also id.
§ 1191b(d)(5)(B) (defining family members as including any “first-degree,
second-degree, third-degree, or fourth-degree relative”).
170. DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE
US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998).
171. Id. at 3–14.
172. Id. at 334.
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Reporting Act (FCRA) in 1970 to regulate credit reporting
agencies.173 The FCRA, among other things, sets out permissible uses of credit reports, discusses authorized and unauthorized uses, and makes provision for disclosures to consumers.174
This last provision is of particular relevance to the discussion of
genetic information. The FCRA requires credit reporting agencies, upon request of the consumer, to disclose information in
the consumer’s file, the sources of the information, the identification of anyone that procured consumer reports, and reasons
for adverse characterizations of the consumer.175
Applying similar rules to the access to, and use of, DNA
sequence and other genetic information would provide useful
complements to GINA and other genetic nondiscrimination
laws. Just as the FCRA regulates credit reporting agencies, legislation controlling the use of genetic information could apply to
entities that generate and store DNA sequence information.
Because of the highly fragmented ways in which medical care is
delivered in the United States, legislation aimed at controlling
organizations storing DNA sequence information would be
more effective if it provided for “trusted brokers” that could
maintain sequence information databases that were independent of the end users of the data, applying a further layer of protection preventing misuse of the data.176
Admittedly, even as the FCRA has not prevented the misuse of personal financial information in cases of, for instance,
identity theft, controls over the disclosure of genetic information would, by themselves, probably not prevent all instances of
genetic discrimination. Even if a person was aware that his
employer had accessed his DNA sequence, he might not know
what actions his employer took based on that information.
Fundamentally, it is the task of genetic nondiscrimination legislation, such as GINA, to address such abuses. Still, knowledge that his employer had examined his genetic information
173. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 716; see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681(b) (2006) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce . . . in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer . . . .”).
174. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 716–19.
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g.
176. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, New Venture Aims to Guard Genetic Data,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2000, at C2, available at 2000 WLNR 3300345 (noting the
example of First Genetic Trust, a company that billed itself as a “genetic bank,”
holding a person’s genetic information in a secure account and only releasing it
with that person’s permission).
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shortly before terminating his employment might allow an employee to develop a case that he had been discriminated against
because of his genetic constitution.
It is also likely true that merely allowing people to determine the identity of those who had access to their genetic information will not result in the majority of them actually monitoring the use of that information. It may be necessary to
develop easy-to-understand protocols demonstrating how to obtain and understand genetic “credit reports” to encourage their
use. Education may help allay concerns that genetic information is too complicated to understand, but instead the important thing is the more manageable task of being aware of the
entities looking at the information. Further, it is reasonable to
expect that employers, insurers, and others with inclinations to
misuse genetic information would be more careful in their actions if they knew that the “owners” of the information could
monitor those actions. Even if everyone did not scrupulously
monitor access to and use of his or her genetic information, it is
likely that public interest groups would bring instances of misuse to light and engender powerful normative forces inhibiting
genetic discrimination.
Combining efforts aimed at educating policy makers and
the public about the distinctions between genetic privacy and
genetic discrimination with legislation allowing people to monitor access to their genetic information should empower those
concerned about abuses of their genetic data to prevent such
misuse. Establishing these normative forces would reduce genetic discrimination by employers, insurance carriers, and other groups that might otherwise be inclined to misuse genetic information.
CONCLUSION
People are both fascinated with and concerned about the
ways that advances in biomedical research could shape their
lives. It is imperative that physicians, scientists, and others use
new insights into genetics to benefit the public by allowing the
development of new disease prevention and treatment options,
rather than hurt them by limiting access to health insurance or
free choice of employment. Given the nature of DNA, the idea
that an individual can maintain complete control over the way
his or her genetic information is used is flawed. People need to
better understand the limits inherent to genetic privacy so that
they can make educated decisions about how to use that infor-

2010]

RELATIVE FUTILITY

713

mation. It would be unfortunate if the children of people like
Alan and Keri Bearder were denied the benefit of genetic tests
such as newborn screening programs because of concerns, however well- or ill-placed, about the fate of the DNA sequence information needed for the tests.
As well as making comprehensive efforts to teach the public about genetic information and the ways it can be used and
misused, it is important that genetic nondiscrimination measures be strengthened. A protective measure that needs to be
developed is a mechanism to allow individuals to have access to
their genetic “report cards” and to make sure they know who
else has had access to their genetic information. Making the
availability and use of genetic information more transparent
will benefit everyone by reducing opportunities for misuse of
genetic information and the possibility of genetic discrimination.
Efforts directed to the protection of genetic privacy at first
glance seem uncontroversial. In trying to curtail access to genetic information in ways that are ineffective because of inherent limits to the extent that it is possible to control access to
DNA sequence information and that work to prevent socially
beneficial outcomes, genetic privacy protections may be ineffective or even harmful. Rather than concentrating attention on
genetic privacy, directing efforts to the prevention of genetic
discrimination will produce greater social good.

